

10 APR 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM:

Evaluations and Plans Staff  
Directorate of Operations

SUBJECT: Proposed Suggestions to Congressional  
Oversight Committees

In response to several discussions with you concerning the need for improvements in the oversight process, attached are some suggestions in areas of particular concern to us, most of which relate to security.

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: ODDO  
Comptroller

S E C R E T

## SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF OVERSIGHT PROCESS

a. Staffers should be urged to avoid insecure handling and storage of classified materials. Example: In October 1985, a senior SSCI staff member had a copy of a TOP SECRET/CODEWORD staff study at his residence, where he passed it to an OCA representative.

b. Congressional staffers should be asked to avoid references to the existence of CIA stations in unclassified correspondence with CIA and other agencies. Such references in congressional correspondence with the Department of State is evidenced by their appearance in unclassified State cable traffic.

25X1 c. Congressional staff mention of CIA stations and personnel should also be avoided in other unclassified channels. Examples of this were references to the CIA station in two early February 1986 international telephone calls by an SSCI staffer [redacted]

25X1 d. The possible compromise of cover through overt contact by our personnel abroad with members and staff of the SSCI and HPSCI should perhaps be noted to the committees to increase their awareness of this hazard. These committees and their membership are, of course, overt, as is their intelligence connection. As a result, overt contact with them is not consistent with cover. We recall the hostile surveillance of [redacted]

25X1 e. The following are possible areas for improvement in security procedures in oversight committee hearings:

25X1 (1) In response to EPS [redacted] query, OCA advised on 23 December 1985 that the SAC/Defense Appropriations Subcommittee continues to use a commercial transcription service. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] It would seem that the security of such transcription arrangements should periodically be reviewed and confirmed by OCA.

(2) The SSCI has occasionally used its shielded hearing room for meetings with the press and other uncleared persons. The most recent such occasion was for the open confirmation hearing of Mr. Gates on 10 April.

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The security of such actions and the currentness of counteraudio measures should be reviewed by competent authority.

(3) Staff attendance at especially sensitive hearings should be limited. For example, 23 SSCI staffers (and only seven members) attended the highly sensitive 20 March hearing concerning defectors.

(4) The committees should be asked to ensure that their own CA compartmentation designations are observed at hearings and elsewhere.

f. The carrying of compromising documents (including travel schedules reflecting contacts with CIA personnel abroad) by committee travelers has been surmised and should be discouraged. Members and staffers should be asked to pouch any such documents generated during their travel and should be advised of pouch security requirements (e.g., the excision of true names, use of split transmissions, etc.).

g. The practice of greater selectivity by all congressional entities in screening constituent inquiries to eliminate those which do not merit or should not (e.g., due to Privacy Act restrictions) receive CIA response would save valuable manhours and expedite responses.

h. A substantial portion of DO managerial time is spent in response to congressional requirements. This is time that would otherwise be available for operational activity. Staffer availability for briefings at CIA Headquarters rather than requiring the briefers' travel to the Hill would do much to reduce this burden. (This is less a problem with SSCI than with other oversight entities.)

i. The responsiveness of CIA field components to the briefing needs of congressional travelers would be assisted by earliest possible notification of travel plans and greater specificity in pre-trip statements of CODEL purpose and objectives.